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Conventional block-based multicast authentication schemes overlook the heterogeneity of receivers by letting
the sender choose the block size, divide a multicast stream into blocks, associate each block with a signature, and
spread the effect of the signature across all the packets in the block through hash graphs or coding algorithms.
The correlation among packets makes them vulnerable to packet loss, which is inherent in the Internet and
wireless networks. Moreover, the lack of Denial of Service (DoS) resilience renders most of them vulnerable to
packet injection in hostile environments. In this paper, we propose a novel multicast authentication protocol,
namely MABS, including two schemes. The basic scheme (MABS-B) eliminates the correlation among packets
and thus provides the perfect resilience to packet loss, and it is also efficient in terms of latency, computation,
and communication overhead due to an efficient cryptographic primitive called batch signature, which supports
the authentication of any number of packets simultaneously.so we discuss their comparisons and performance
evaluation of Packet Loss, Comparisons over Lossy Channels, Comparisons of Signature Schemes, computationa-
tional overheads etc.
Keywords : Denial of Service (DoS) ,MABS,MABS-BSignature Schemes.
1. INTRODUCTION
Generally, there are following issues in real
world challenging the design. Efficiency: While
the sender of multimedia content is usually a
powerful server, receivers can have different capa-
bilities and resources. Resilience to packet loss:
Packet may be lost during wireless transmission.
In the Internet, congestion at routers is a major
reason causing packet loss.
Resilience to denial of service (DoS) attacks:
Forged packets injected into a multicast stream
increase the workload of receivers and cause the
drop of authentic packets, leading to DoS. A cer-
tain level of resilience to DoS attacks should be
provided. Recently, batch signature schemes can
be used to improve the performance of broadcast
authentication [2], [3].
In this paper, we present comprehensive study
on this approach and propose a novel multicast
authentication protocol called MABS. MABS
uses an efficient asymmetric cryptographic prim-
itive called batch signature [3],[4], [5], which sup-
ports the authentication of any number of packets
simultaneously with one signature verification, to
address the efficiency and packet loss problems.
MABS provides data integrity,data origin authen-
tication, and non-repudiation. In addition, we
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(i) Our MABS can achieve perfect resilience to
Packet loss in lossy channels in the sense
that no matter how many packets are lost
the already received packets can still be au-
thenticated by receivers.
(ii) MABS-B is efficient in terms of less authen-
tication latency, computation, and commu-
nication overhead. Though MABS-E is less
efficient than MABS-B since it includes the
DoS defense.
(iii) We propose two new batch signature
schemes based on BLS and DSA and show
they are more efficient than the batch RSA
[5] signature scheme.
1.1. Properties of Multicast:
The definition of the host group model provides
a summary of the key properties of multicast: a
host group is a set of network entities sharing a
common identifying multicast address, all receiv-
ing any data packets addressed to this multicast
address by senders (sources) that may or may not
be members of the same group and have no knowl-
edge of the groups membership. This definition
highlights the three main properties of multicast:
(i) All members receive all packets sent to the
address: Multicast routing delivers all pack-
ets sent to the multicast address to all mem-
bers of the multicast group.
(ii) Open group membership: Multicast pro-
vides an open group model and allows
group membership to be transparent to the
source.
1.2. Multicast Routing Protocol:
Multicast routers execute a multicast routing
protocol to define delivery paths that enable the
forwarding of multicast datagrams across an in-
ternetwork. The Distance Vector Multicast Rout-
ing Protocol (DVMRP) is a distance-vector rout-
ing protocol, and Multicast OSPF (MOSPF) is an
extension to the OSPF link-state unicast routing
protocol.
A multicast protocol enables a sender to effi-
ciently disseminate digital media data to many
receivers. Due to the time sensitive requirement
Table 1




→ Segment retransmission and flow control through windowing No windowing or retransmission
→Acknowledge segments No acknowledgement
of some applications, reliable transmission pro-
tocol like TCP (Transmission Control Protocol)
is impractical for multicast. Therefore, unreli-
able transmission protocol such as UDP (User
Datagram Protocol) is generally adopted for mul-
ticast applications. Multicast protocol is suit-
able for many applications, e.g. video trans-
missions, live broadcasts, stock quotes, or news
feeds. These applications may have many re-
ceivers or distribute time-sensitive data. To en-
sure secure communications between a sender and
its receivers, it is important to implement security
measures in a multicast environment.
1.3. Security Issues and Solutions:
These properties of multicast lead to security
issues and vulnerabilities because of two reasons:
the issues are multicast- specific or the issues also
exist in unicast, but the unicast solutions do not
apply.the three multicast properties leads to vul-
nerabilities and the areas of research that provide
solutions to these issues. The multicast model
delivers any traffic sent to the multicast address
to the entire group. This means that any host
can send data to the multicast group. This leads
to two problems. First, group members need to
be able to verify that messages received are from
the intended source. Multicast source authentica-
tion solutions have been proposed to provide this
functionality. Second, there should be mecha-
nisms to restrict unauthorized sources from send-
ing data to multicast groups due to the poten-
tial for denial-of-service attacks. Multicast sender
access control solutions are necessary to defend
against this threat.
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2. COMPARISON AND PERFOR-
MANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate MABS performance
in terms of resilience to packet loss, efficiency, au-
thentication latency and DoS resilience. As we
discussed before, MABS does not assume any par-
ticular underlying signature algorithm. This is
also true for all the literature multicast authenti-
cation schemes referenced in this paper. There-
fore, all the discussions and evaluations of MABS
and the literature works are under the assumption
that they are using the same underlying signature
algorithm. : We consider the authentication of
digital streams over a lossy network. The over-
all approach taken is graph-based, as this yields
simple methods for controlling overhead, delay,
and the ability to authenticate, while serving to
unify many previously known hash- and MAC-
based techniques. The loss pattern of the network
is defined probabilistically, allowing both bursty
and random packet loss to be modeled.
The main challenges are fourfold. First, au-
thenticity must be guaranteed even when only
the sender of the data is trusted. Second, the
scheme needs to scale to potentially millions of re-
ceivers. Third, streamed media distribution can
have high packet loss. Finally, the system needs
to be efficient to support fast packet rates. We use
simulations to evaluate the resilience to packet
loss. The metric here is the verification rate, i.e.,
the ratio of the number of authenticated pack-
ets to the number of received packets we com-
pare MABS with some well-known loss tolerant
schemes EMSS,augmented chain,PiggyBack,tree
chain. These schemes are representatives of
graph chaining, tree chaining, and erasure cod-
ing schemes and are widely usedin performance
evaluation in the literature. For EMSS we choose
the chain configuration , which has the best per-
formance among all the configurations of length
. For AugChain , we choose chain configuration.
For PiggyBack , we choose two class priorities.
For Tree chain [1], we choose binary tree. For
all these schemes, we choose the block size of 256
packets and simulate over 100 blocks. We con-
sider the random loss and the burst loss with a
maximum loss length of 10 packets.
Figure 1. Verification rate under the random loss
model
The verification rates under different loss rates
are given in below Figures. OurMABS and Tree
schemes have perfect resilience to packet loss in
the sense that all the received packets can be au-
thenticated. This is because all the packets in
MABS and Tree schemes are independent from
each other.
2.1. Comparison
We consider latency, computation, and commu-
nication overhead for efficiency evaluation under
lossy channels and DoS channels.
The notations used here are defined in Table :
(i) All the evaluations are carried out over on
packets .
2.2. Resilience to Packet Loss:
We use simulations to evaluate the resilience
to packet loss. The metric here is the verifica-
tion rate, i.e., the ratio of the number of au-
thenticated packets to the number of received
packets. We compare MABS with some well-
known loss tolerant schemes EMSS augmented
chain (AugChain) Piggyback tree chain (Tree)
and SAIDA [2]. These schemes are representa-
tives of graph chaining, tree Chaining and era-
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Figure 2. Verification rate under the burst loss
model with the maximum burst length 10
Figure 3. All the evaluations are carried out over
n packets
sure coding schemes and are widely used in per-
formance evaluation in the literature.
2.3. Efficiency:
We consider authentication latency, computa-
tion, and communication overhead for efficiency
evaluation under lossy channels and DoS chan-
nels.
2.4. Authentication Latency:
The block-based approach requires each re-
ceiver to collect an entire block before authen-
ticating every packet in the block. A larger block
size achieves higher computation efficiency, but
also incurs longer authentication latency. Our
design does not have authentication latency .Be-
cause there is no relationship among packets and
no limit on the number of packets in batch verifi-
cation, each receiver can perform the batch verifi-
cation over its buffered packets whenever higher-
layer application require.
2.5. DoS Resilience:
DoS is a method for an attacker to deplete the
resources of a receiver. processing forged pack-
ets from the attacker always consumes a certain
amount of resources. The block-based approach
has poor resilience to DoS. Because there is no
filtering, each receiver has to recover the relation-
ship among authentic packets mixed with forged
packets. By using Merkle tree in our design, au-
thentic packets and forged packets are separated
into disjoint sets. Batch verification is carried out
over each set. Therefore, each batch verification
can authenticate a set of packets.
2.6. Comparisons of Signature Schemes:
We compare the computation overhead of three
batch signature schemes in below table RSA and
BLS require one modular exponentiation at the
sender and DSA requires two modular multipli-
cations when r value is computed offline. Usually
one c-bit modular exponentiation is equivalent to
1.5c modular multiplications over the same field.
Moreover, a c-bit modular exponentiation in DLP
is equivalent to a c/6-bit modular exponentia-
tion in BLS for the same security level. There-
fore, we can estimate that the computation over-
head of one 1,024-bit RSA signing operation is
Preparation of International Journal of Information Processing Paper in Two-Column Format 5
Figure 4. Computational Overhead of Different
Batch Schemes
roughly equivalent to that of 768 DSA signing op-
erations (1,536 modular multiplications) and that
of 6 BLS signing operations (each one is corre-
sponding to255 modular multiplications).
Below Table shows the comparisons between
MABS-B and well known loss-tolerant schemes
tree chain (Tree) ,EMSS,PiggyBack ,augmented
chain (AugChain) , and SAIDA . MABS-B elimi-
nates the correlation among packets. Each packet
is independently sent out at the sender.
We also compare the length of two popular
hash algorithm MD5 [4] and SHA-1 [5] and the
Signature length of three signature algorithms
in MABS network generates a 320-bit signature.
It is clear that by using BLS or DSA, MABS
can achieve more bandwidth efficiency than using
RSA, and could be even more efficient than con-
ventional schemes using a large number of hashes.
3. CONCLUSIONS
To reduce the signature verification overheads
in the secure multimedia multicasting, block-
based authentication schemes have been pro-
posed. Unfortunately, most previous schemes
have many problems such as vulnerability to
packet loss and lack of resilience to denial of ser-
Figure 5. Comparisons over Lossy Channels:
Table 2
Given the same security level as 1,024-bit RSA,
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vice (DoS) attack. To overcome these problems,
we develop a novel authentication scheme MABS.
We have demonstrated that MABS is perfectly
resilient to packet loss due to the elimination of
the correlation among packets and can effectively
deal with DoS attack. Moreover, we also show
that the use of batch signature can achieve the
efficiency less than or comparable with the con-
ventional schemes. Finally, we further develop
two new batch signature schemes based on BLS
and DSA, which are more efficient than the batch
RSA signature scheme.
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